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H5NLLONC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 KEYU LONG, 4 Plaintiff, 5 17 CV 2613 (KPF) V. 6 AMWAY CORP., 7 Defendant. 8 New York, N.Y. 9 May 23, 2017 4:03 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 LOUIS J. MAIONE 15 Attorney for Plaintiff 16 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP Attorneys for Defendant 17 BY: DAVID J. FIOCCOLA ADAM J. HUNT 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

(Case called; appearances taken)

THE COURT: From the folks at the back table, is there one of you in particular to whom I should be directing my questions?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Probably me, your Honor, David Fioccola.

THE COURT: Thank you. I will do that. You're welcome to sit down, except for you, Mr. Maione, because I want to understand a little bit more about the case.

Could you tell me, please, because I'm not sure I understand it fully from the pleadings, how your client came to find this opportunity and sign this particular contract because it was done online. Correct?

MR. MAIONE: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Is it a situation where she was on the internet looking at business opportunities?

MR. MAIONE: My understanding is that she was introduced to the Amway products and the sale of Amway through another Chinese friend, another Asian friend, and went to the website and that's how she signed up.

THE COURT: And as I'm understanding what you're saying in your submissions, Amway does have these contracts in other languages but not on the online version. That's only in English.

MR. MAIONE: That's my understanding. Not only in

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English, in Spanish.

THE COURT: English and Spanish.

MR. MAIONE: Spanish.

THE COURT: And your client speaks Mandarin?

MR. MAIONE: To tell you the truth, your Honor, I do not know what dialect she speaks. But when I met her five years ago for the first time, she did not speak -- well, she spoke some English.

THE COURT: Okay. You raise an interesting issue. You met with her five years ago. This complaint was obviously --

MR. MAIONE: I've represented both she and her husband on other matters.

THE COURT: Other matters. Okay. Ever have any problems communicating with her?

MR. MAIONE: A bit in the beginning.

THE COURT: Okay. Why I ask, sir, is for my parents, English is their one and only language, but asking them to interpret contract provisions, it's not a question of their fluency in a particular language, it's the fact that they're not lawyers.

So your argument is -- I want to make sure I get this correct -- is it that only the arbitration provision is unconscionable, or the entire agreement is unconscionable, or having someone who is not a native English speaker sign this or the Spanish equivalent of it, what's procedurally unconscionable?

MR. MAIONE: I think it's procedurally unconscionable, your Honor, as to the relationship between Asians, like my client, who are not in equal bargaining power with Amway, in addition to the fact that they did not understand the contract at all. The substantive issue is the ADR procedures themselves. There are three different procedures. They all take place up in Michigan. They don't get the issues resolved, they're all at the expense of the potential plaintiffs. And as I stated in my letter, although it was the Ninth Circuit interpreted the provisions of the contract under California law, there have been two cases where the courts have come down and said that the contract is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

THE COURT: Are you saying that the very terms that were addressed in the *Pokorny* case, and I'm not sure I know what the other one is, it's the exact same set of provisions implicated in this case?

MR. MAIONE: Almost to a tee, yes.

THE COURT: I see. All right.

MR. MAIONE: And just to add, your Honor, there are several other potential plaintiffs who speak -- I didn't put them in this complaint because I thought that the better way to approach this was -- I anticipated that I was giving to have to

deal with the issue of whether the defendant was going to try to compel arbitration, and I don't want to take the money from these people if ultimately it was determined that we'd have to arbitrate. But, for example, the other four or five whom I've met, and I think there are about 70 or so.

THE COURT: Seventy, sir?

MR. MAIONE: Seventy whose bonuses have been withheld. The five that I've met speak no English at all and I've had to deal with them through an interpreter.

THE COURT: They're speaking no English, but did they sign an agreement to be IBOs?

MR. MAIONE: They clicked on it, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I see. They clicked on something they didn't know?

MR. MAIONE: Apparently.

THE COURT: That's curious. But today you're not bringing a class action.

MR. MAIONE: Not, no.

THE COURT: Not today. And today you're not seeking to amend to make this a class action.

MR. MAIONE: No, your Honor. As I said, I thought the better of it because if ultimately we were to lose this issue, I'm going to represent them. I anticipate representing them in arbitrations if they decide that they want to traipse up to Michigan for three times. So I thought we'd do it that way.

THE COURT: All right. To be clear, this is both our initial conference and a premotion conference. From you, in the first instance, I just want to hear about your case and then I'm going to talk to the folks at the back table and then we'll talk more about the unconscionability arguments that you're making. I want to make sure I understand your claims. And your argument is your client thought she was getting a bonus, but she didn't get a bonus.

MR. MAIONE: That's correct.

THE COURT: And she should have gotten a bonus.

MR. MAIONE: That's correct.

THE COURT: And I want to understand, well, I guess the complaint suggests that there are 75 to a hundred folks who were denied bonuses, all of whom were of Asian extraction, correct?

MR. MAIONE: That's my understanding, yes. Everyone who hasn't gotten a bonus is Asian.

THE COURT: And I guess I'd like to know how you came to know that because, for example, it may be that folks in the Asian community are talking about not receiving the bonuses and, therefore, you know that this group of people in this community are not receiving bonuses. But how do you know that there aren't folks in other ethnic —

MR. MAIONE: I don't.

THE COURT: Okay. So how do you know there's not an

1 equal opportunity denial of bonuses?

MR. MAIONE: I don't know that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. This case is seeking a declarative judgment that the discrimination, by which you mean the failure to pay your client the bonus she believes she was entitled to, was because of her ethnicity. So I guess what I'm trying to understand is how do we know that folks of Asian extraction are being treated differently from folks of Hispanic extraction or folks of pick any ethnicity you'd like?

MR. MAIONE: That's a good question, your Honor, and I don't really know the answer, but I think it's somewhat apparent that 70 some odd people, all of whom are Asian, have not gotten their bonuses.

THE COURT: And that may be regrettable, but how many IBOs, well, folks at the back table are going to tell me how many there are in this country. I suspect the answer is a lot.

MR. MAIONE: Yes.

THE COURT: And I guess I would feel a little bit more comfortable about your allegations if, for example, you had some comparators. If you could say and they are friends with a whole bunch of Latinas who did get their bonuses, but we don't have that.

MR. MAIONE: We don't have that, your Honor. And I've thought of this -- pardon me for interrupting -- I've thought of this that -- I hate to use the word, but it could be

So

coincidental insofar as the plaintiff and these other folks 1 that I know seem to operate in fairly closed Asian circles. 2 3 it's possible that these are just a lot of people that they 4 know and they were all deprived of their bonus. But as you 5 pointed out, your Honor, there could be people of Latino decent 6 who have not gotten bonuses and various different people. 7 I imagine we'll be able to find some of that don't know that. out in discovery, but I don't know the answer to that. 8 9 THE COURT: And what reason was given for the denial 10 of the bonus to your client? 11 MR. MAIONE: That she didn't make her quotas. 12 THE COURT: And she believes she did? 13 MR. MAIONE: Yes. 14 THE COURT: All right. This was October of 2016; that's when she was advised she wasn't getting her bonus. 15 16 that correct? 17 MR. MAIONE: That's correct. THE COURT: Was that the first time that she had 18 19 failed to obtain a bonus that she believed she qualified for? 20 MR. MAIONE: Yes, that's my understanding. It usually is through the end of the bonus period through the end of 21 22 August, I believe, and they notified her in October that she 23 wasn't getting the bonus. The bonus isn't paid in October. 24 It's through October and she usually gets paid in the fall and 25 that's when they found out that they weren't getting paid the

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THE COURT: And could you remind me, please, the size, generally speaking, ballpark it, please, what kind of bonus are we talking about?

MR. MAIONE: Keyu Long's bonus is about \$117,000, as best she can calculate. The other folks are somewhere between 75 and 125. And one woman contends that she's somewhere around 250,000.

THE COURT: Were all of these bonuses denied in or about October of 2016?

MR. MAIONE: Yes, yes, to my understanding, yes.

THE COURT: And prior to that date, sir, there were no bonus issues of which you were made aware?

MR. MAIONE: Not that I was made aware of, no.

THE COURT: Your client didn't have any problems.

MR. MAIONE: Not that I know of, no. I was not informed of that. As I said, I represented her husband and her husband's business for a while, and the first time I heard about it was last fall.

THE COURT: And in your discussions with other colleagues of your client, other IBOs, did any of them tell you that they had been wrongfully deprived of bonuses at any point prior to October of 2016?

MR. MAIONE: Not that I can remember your Honor, no.

THE COURT: And recognizing that this is hearsay, did

anyone say to you that someone had been denied a bonus for years prior to 2016?

MR. MAIONE: I think the answer to that is no, as well. I did not spend a great deal of time with them because I don't represent them.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. MAIONE: Therefore, I would have an issue. So that's kind of where we are at this point.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me talk to the folks at the back table.

All right, sir, let's start with the easy question. Do you know why Ms. Long was not given a bonus?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Not yet, your Honor.

THE COURT: I thought that was going to be the easy question. Okay. You agree she was not given a bonus?

MR. FIOCCOLA: I would assume. I don't have reason to think that that's incorrect at this point. When we were retained, any challenges to the ADR provision, which is a much larger issue to us than the issue of the bonus — and we can dive into that. We haven't yet done that because we were focused more on the challenge to the arbitration provision which impacts, you know, a decision in New York obviously invalidating that would have much greater impact beyond this case, which as of right now is not a class action.

THE COURT: Understood. It was intellectually

stimulating for me but less interesting for you. Let us talk about the provision that you wish to enforce.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Well, your Honor, just on that one point though, if I may, it's not even entirely clear just from reading the complaint what provision he's claiming is breached or what happened or what the quota was. So we can factually investigate it on our side, but the complaint itself we think doesn't even have that bare minimum amount of information.

THE COURT: I suspect that if there weren't the arbitration provision that you're asking me to compel enforcement of, you'd be making a 12(b)(6) argument.

MR. FIOCCOLA: That is right.

THE COURT: I understand that. I am interested in the facts because that's kind of what I do. But I do understand that you're interested in this issue, the arbitration provision. So I'll turn to that because that's in part what's bringing us here today.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Sure.

THE COURT: Sir, do you agree with me that the provision in this case is sufficiently broad, is so broad that the question of arbitrability itself is committed to the arbitrator?

MR. FIOCCOLA: We believe that's up to the arbitrator to decide as per the agreement between the parties. But the way we would address that, your Honor, in briefing is while we

think that the delegation clause does delegate all of these issues to the arbitrator, we would also argue in the alternative that in the event that the Court disagrees with that, we would make the arguments as to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement to the Court.

THE COURT: Sort of my limited investigation of this, which is a couple of hours looking through some cases, is that while this is on the very broadside of arbitration clauses, inasmuch as I'm understanding plaintiff to the challenging not the entirety of the agreement but these provisions of the agreement, I suspect that I am the one charged under Second Circuit law with determining whether or not the agreement, this provision of the agreement is unconscionable. So I think, I suspect, but if I'm wrong, we'll all figure this out during the briefing process, I think I'd have to make the antecedent determination of whether or not this is unconscionable. Hence, I'm trying to figure out what is unconscionable.

So there is discussion about both procedural and substantive unconscionability. I'm aware of the *Pokorny* case. We'll put that to the side for a moment, please. I am aware there is a decision from Judge Caproni, a colleague of mine, from last week — hot off the presses — *Qiu v. Jia Xing 39th Inc.* It's an unreported Westlaw decision that I imagine you've seen, but it there speaks to this specific issue of the enforceability of an arbitration provision for someone who

claims to be unable to speak English or understand all of its nuances.

What I've looked at suggests that there are circumstances where one's comprehension of the English language matters. For instance, situations where employers are handing out documents to their employees and suggesting that things must be signed or else they're going to immediately be fired or need to get back to work, okay. This is a little bit different because in theory she selected, was given an opportunity to sign on for this.

Is there an opt out provision for Amway's ADR?

MR. FIOCCOLA: I'd need to check, your Honor. We could check that.

THE COURT: You understand the concept.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Yeah.

THE COURT: Because I just -- I actually can't disclose the other defendant because I haven't yet issued the decision. But in this other case I have, there's a very specific provision for employment disputes that allows the employee to opt out within let's say 30 days of joining the company. So if they want out, they can do it. I didn't know whether there was a similar one. And for some courts, that particular provision has some force.

But just focusing on the procedural, why is this not procedurally unconscionable where it's presented not merely as

a take it or leave it, but as a click and you're done?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Your Honor, I think there's a lot of good case law in the Second Circuit, and if I can address the *Pokorny* decision as well.

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. FIOCCOLA: We think -- and unfortunately we don't get a reply to the plaintiff's letter, so if I can just address some of the issues that he raised.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Obviously, they entered into an agreement. I don't think that there's a dispute. They're claiming they're entitled to the bonus under the agreement. They alternatively plead unjust enrichment, which we understand. But I think the Court can accept the fact that there is an agreement between the parties and the issue is whether the arbitration agreement will become valid.

So if I could address unconscionability, the plaintiffs make their argument on a 2010 Ninth Circuit decision, the *Pokorny* decision. That predates, Judge, the *AT&T Concepcion* decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. Also, it's applying Ninth Circuit law, which doesn't apply here. But more importantly, *Pokorny* is no longer good law.

THE COURT: Because there's a California court decision that invalidated one part of it.

MR. FIOCCOLA: That's right. The Supreme Court

decision in June 2014, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation, 327 P.3d 129. It held that prior rulings that arbitration clauses and class action waivers were unconscionable prior to Concepcion are contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent. And the point is that the state law principle of unconscionability can't override a valid arbitration agreement governed by the FAA. So the reliance on Pokorny and this argument of res judicata we think is no longer applicable here.

THE COURT: Sir, is there in fact substantively identical provisions --

MR. FIOCCOLA: I think they made some refinements to it. What a lot of companies do is as these issues are litigated, they make adjustments to arbitration provisions.

But, Judge, so *Iskanian* was decided in June 2014. A month later, in July 2014, in a case called *Lei v. Amway*, the Central District of California held that the Amway arbitration provision was valid and enforceable, nearly identical to the provisions here, including the conciliation provision, which is the pre-arbitration dispute mechanism.

THE COURT: But was there an allegation in the *Lei* case that there were difficulties in understanding?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Yes, there were, Judge, and those arguments were rejected. It's a slip opinion that I have, Judge. It might be on Lexis. But we represented them, so I have that if the Court wants a copy of it.

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. FIOCCOLA: I'm pretty sure, Judge, this is a clean copy.

THE COURT: It's fine. I won't take offense at your highlights.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Thank you.

THE COURT: Sir, that's all right. I won't make you sit here while I read it. Please tell me what you'd like me to know.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Mr. Hunt reminds me that Amway did revise its agreement after *Pokorny*, so it's not exactly the same provision at issue in that case.

Lastly, Judge, and you referenced the Southern

District decision from last week. I'd also want to point out,
although it's not binding on this Court, but the Court might
find the decision persuasive. We represented Uber

Technologies.

THE COURT: Judge Garaufis's decision.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Yes, but also Judge Chen and that was from February of this year where the same arguments were made. It was a New York class action by the drivers. And the argument was that the app is provided, the Uber app is provided in the Chinese language, but the original agreement to sign up to be an Uber driver was not provided in Chinese. And the court rejected that largely on the grounds, as the Court

mentioned, and distinguished those employment cases in that it was something that the plaintiffs had sought out, was an agreement they sought out. And the judge was weighing the employment opportunities that this company was providing against the argument that they couldn't read the agreement and looking at Second Circuit case law found that if you're going to enter into an agreement, you have on obligation to understand it and they could have it translated. It wasn't up to the company to necessarily pay for the translation for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Could you switch, please, to the issue of substantive unconscionability. I think what I'm understanding from plaintiff's counsel is that the process itself, the conciliation process and then I guess the arbitration that would follow, are themselves very heavily weighted in favor of Amway because you have to go to Michigan. The IBO would be bearing the expense of these provisions. I can look for other things they said, but I think you heard Mr. Maione at the beginning list some things that he felt rendered it substantively unconscionable. Could you speak to those issues, please.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Judge, I just think we disagree with that and the cases that have interpreted this provision have not found them to be substantive unconscionable. What I see happen in these cases where location was an issue or cost was

an issue, that's not a reason necessarily to invalidate the provisions because that's something that can be worked out between the parties. And it's not something where if that's what they were going to do, to split the cost or offer to have the arbitration take place in New York, so I've seen that happen as well. But I don't think that it's an agreement — it's not a one-sided agreement. When you find the substantive unconscionability arguments that courts find persuasive is because it's so one-sided as to be unfair. And this is not a situation where one side is picking the sole arbitrator or that the costs would be so excessive that they can't pursue their particular claim.

THE COURT: What I'm remembering from *Pokorny* is there is a provision that the arbitrator had to undergo Amway training or that there would be I guess a difference in whether the fees would be capped depending on whether the arbitrator had some experience or training by Amway or another company or not. Is that still a thing?

MR. FIOCCOLA: One second, your Honor. I'm going to check.

THE COURT: And if Mr. Hunt would prefer to explain it to me, that's fine too.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Your Honor, I believe it's a neutral mediator under AAA.

THE COURT: Under Pokorny, it was JAMS, and it was a

specially trained arbitrator.

MR. FIOCCOLA: That might have been one of the changes that the company had undertaken after that decision.

THE COURT: Okay. Am I correct, sir, that if your client wanted to, they could waive the conciliation in the arbitration provisions?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Yes. I've seen that in cases as well. Usually if the plaintiffs are amenable, those steps can be waived and the parties can go directly to arbitration.

THE COURT: Your client would also be permitted to waive the arbitration provision, yes?

MR. FIOCCOLA: To waive it entirely?

THE COURT: That is what I'm saying, yes. What I mean by that, sir, is there's no obligation that you participate in arbitration, is there? If both sides are amenable to having the matter resolved in a court, that can happen, yes?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Usually that's the case.

THE COURT: But here your client wishes not to. Your client believes that it has the right. It has these provisions. It's something for which it bargained in this process, and it wishes to invoke the benefits of that bargain. Correct?

MR. FIOCCOLA: And that the plaintiffs accepted that, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: I understand. So there's no persuading

you to just let this case go forward and to have your 12(b)(6) motion rather than your motion to compel arbitration.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Well, I think that's right, your Honor.

If I can recall, they also allege as a cause of action -
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FIOCCOLA: -- that the provisions should be invalidated and that's something that I think we would have to address even if we went down the 12(b)(6) route.

THE COURT: Right, because I'm being asked for a declaratory judgment.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Exactly, Judge. And we would prefer to handle this through the FAA and the mechanism set up by the FAA, which has certain appellate rights associated with it, and address that issue first. And then if that motion is denied, then have the opportunity to respond to the complaint.

THE COURT: This I understand. Let's go off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record)

THE COURT: So to be clear, sir, you wish to persist with this motion to compel arbitration?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Yes, your Honor, although I will report the conversation back to our client and the event of today.

And I've been in situations where clients decide to withdraw that motion or the request for it. But as of right now, they want to proceed with the motion to compel arbitration.

THE COURT: Okay. And you can let your client know I'm not foreshadowing or not portending anything. I'm just asking the question. I'm just a woman concerned about her docket.

So with that in mind, approximately how much time would you need for your motion? I'm looking, I was thinking about a June 30 filing date, but if someone is going to be away, you'll have to let me know.

MR. FIOCCOLA: I think June 30 works, Judge. I think we have more of an issue with the week of July 4.

THE COURT: Well, okay.

MR. FIOCCOLA: June 30 will work just fine.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Maione, let's hear from you, sir.

The 31st of July is a Monday. Is that enough time for you to respond, sir?

MR. MAIONE: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: Okay, great. And then comes August. So as I wreck Mr. Hunt's vacation, which is certainly not my intent, August 14? Be honest with me. I don't normally ask about your summer plans.

MR. FIOCCOLA: I plan to be in Italy the first two weeks of August, Judge. But if you wouldn't mind, if you would just give us an extra week.

THE COURT: The 25th?

MR. FIOCCOLA: That would be great.

THE COURT: I'll give you until the 25th. That's more than an extra week, but that's fair. All right.

And then since it is your motion, sir, I'm going to ask you, please, to obtain a transcript of this conference. If you order it in the ordinary course, I'll receive it in time for all of the briefing in this case.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Perfect.

THE COURT: I will assume that you all want oral argument. I will ask for it if it's going to be useful, but we'll see what happens.

Are there any cases of which you're aware at the Second Circuit right now that would impact the issues here? There is an unconscionability case from the Northern District that is up at the circuit now, Judge Wolford, I believe. But that was a very different unconscionability issue. That was substantive and that was because it replaced U.S. law with British Virgin Islands law. So I don't think that helps me in my analysis.

MR. FIOCCOLA: I don't think so, Judge. The most recent, other than the one you mentioned from last week, the most recent decisions that we were aware of were Judge Garaufis and Judge Chen's decisions. But we will in our motion point out to the Court if there is a decision that's on appeal that would be relevant that the Court and the parties should continue to watch.

THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Maione, you heard us talk about some cases, sir. We're talking about them as if you know about them. Are you aware of these decisions from Judge Garaufis and Judge Chen?

MR. MAIONE: No, I'm not, your Honor.

THE COURT: May I ask the folks at the back table to give him the information about those cases.

MR. FIOCCOLA: Absolutely, Judge.

THE COURT: Because my copies are heavily annotated and I don't want you to see all of my highlighting, so we'll do that. But there are I guess three or four cases in this calendar year that arguably touch on the issues raised here.

MR. MAIONE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else to discuss this afternoon?

MR. FIOCCOLA: Just two very brief points.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. FIOCCOLA: I just wanted to be clear, we'll be moving to compel arbitration, but our time to otherwise respond to the complaint will be held in abeyance until that motion is decided?

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. FIOCCOLA: And then we do have on the calendar a status conference for June 7. I wanted to know -- July, sorry. Thank you. July 7. I wanted to see if the Court still wanted

to hold that date.

THE COURT: No. I don't think that's necessary. I think that was going to be the IPTC in this case and now that we've had this conference, what we'll do is we're going to issue a written scheduling order. If nothing else, it populates the ECF entries with this information. In that same order I'll adjourn sine die the July 7 conference because it doesn't make sense.

MR. FIOCCOLA: My point exactly, Judge.

THE COURT: We'll be in the middle of briefing. That is fine.

Sir, anything else today?

MR. FIOCCOLA: That's it.

THE COURT: Mr. Maione?

MR. MAIONE: Your Honor, when would you anticipate having oral argument because it's kind of tentative, but I'm trying to firm up some plans to be in Italy the last two weeks in September.

Italy. I'm going in October, so I'll pass you in the airport terminal. The issue is the downside of being a junior judge is that you have everybody else's reject cases, so, or other cases. So I don't think it would be so soon that you need to worry about your travel plans, and I'm also not sure we'll even need oral argument. I promise you if we do need it, we'll

H5NLLONC schedule it with enough time to accommodate everyone's trips to Italy. I do appreciate you letting know me about that. Anything else? MR. MAIONE: No. MR. FIOCCOLA: Nothing from us, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you all very much.